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1

RUSSELL S. SCHOW,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

)

vs.
GUARDTONE, INC., et al,
Defendants and Respondents.

·1

CASE
NO. 10546

1

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action brought by 34 Plaintiffs to set aside
and declare null and void the certain contracts which Plainhffs alleged were entered into by the fraudulent representations of the Defendants or their assignors.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court at pretrial separated the claims into
17 different separate trials. The trial for the claim of
Russell S. and Dora Schow was had before a jury and sub-
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mitted on special interrogatories. At the close of all of
the evidence the Defendants moved for a directed verdict.
The trial court did not take this under advisement but
rather denied the Defendants' motion. The jury on special
inteTrogatories then found that there was clear and convincing evidence of the fraudulent misrepresentations and
actions of the Defendant, Guardtone, Inc. After the jury
verdict, the Defendants moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict om the grounds that there was insuf.
ficient evidence as a matteT of law to show that the Defendant, Guardtone, Inc. fraudulently intended not to perform the promises made at the time the contracts were
undertaken. The trial court granted a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds that the
evidence was insufficient as a matter of law and does not
justify the verdict.

REIJEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent wants the judgment notwithstanding
the verdict rendered by the trial court to be set aside and
that judiment be entered on the jury verdict

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellants on this appeal claim that they are one
of a group of 17 couples who were contacted by a representative of a Company which called itself Guardtane, and
who were induced to purchase a fire alarm and interootnmunication system called NuTone. They claim that the
same methods were used in contacting each couple, that
the representations made were fraudulent and false and
that tttis i.s part of a general scheme by the iDefendallU
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and a corrunon cOlll'se of action to defraud the Plaintiffs.
The testimony showed that on or about the 8th day
of September, 1962, Russell S. and Dora Schow were con-

tacted by Albert Hughes, who told the Schows that he represented a company called Guardtone. The Schows testified that Hughes represented to them that Guardtone of
Utah was a separate corporation from Gua:rdtone, Inc., and
was established to handle the Guardtone matters in Utah
(T. 21, 47).

The Schows further testified that Albert Hughes represented to the Schows that they had been selected to be
advertisers of the Guardtone Company and that they could
purchase this product at no cost to them by giving the
company a list of names, referrals of their friends. They
were to receive $400 for each 20 names that they referred
to the Guardtone Company. Mr. Hughes represented that
he would contact them and that the Schows w'ould get this
money after he had contacted each group of 20 people.
He told them that they would receive $400 for each 20
people contacted regardless of whether the salesman was
able to make a sale.
Subsequently the company did not perform on its
agreement to contact these people and to pay the Schows
the money. The Schows testified that they made repeated
effort to cooperate with and aid the company by making
specific appointments with their friends and confirming
th~ appointments with representa:tives of the company
so that Guardtone could perform its part of the agreement.
The Schows also testified that no salesman or representatives contacted the people on the list, they did not keep
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the appointments which the Schows made for them and
they did not pay the money they said they WIOuld pay,
The Plaintiff tendered proof to the court that the Defendants have followed a similar course of dealings with
the other Plaintiffs, that they had similarly not performed
and that this was therefore a part of a common or general
scheme and plan to defraud the Plaintiffs and that the Defendants had no intention of performing their agreements.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A
JUDGMENT N01WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT FOR
THE REASON THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS sum.
CIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT, GUARDTONE, INC., DllD NOT INTEND TO PER·
FORM THE PROMISE THAT THE PLAINTIFFS
WOULD RECEIVE THE PROMISED SUMS UNDER THE
ADVERTISING CONTRACT TO PAY FOR THE EQUIP·
MENT PURCHASED BY THiE PLAINTIFFS.

The testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Schow clearly showro
that Albert Hughes promised that the Guardtone Company
would pay $400.00 for each twenty names that Hughei
contacted (Transcript Pages 19, 48, 71). The advertising
agreement, which is Exhibit "A" of the Plaintiffs' com·
plaint, and includes Pages 9 and 10 of the record, clea.r!Y
and effectively substantiates the representation.
The Schows' testimony shows that they earnestlY at·
teiripted to perform their part of the agreement. TheY
ga\re Mr. Hughes 41 names on Saturday, September 8, 1962
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ITr. Pages 25, 77, Exhibit 7); an interim set of forty names
sometime shortly thereafter (Tr. Page 77); and a final list
of 44 names on October 26, 1962, (which is Exhibit 8, Transcript Pages 29, 77). As the testimony, the Guardtone
Advertising Agreement, and the record clearly show, only
two s£t of names were required and the Plaintiffs faithfully
performed their part of the obligation by providing an extra
set of names, for a total of three sets (Tr. P:ages 54, 77).
After performing as they were required to do, the

Schows then gave the Guardtone representatives time to
perform. Hughes had represented to them, and ,the Advertising Agreements specifically state that it may take
some time to make the contacts.
It was during this waiting period that it became appar-

ent that the Guardtone people, from the outset, had never
intended to perform as they represented. Their tactics
consisted of evasion rather than apology, and this was
punctuated by the fact that the telephone number of Guardtone was changed a number of times and was finally disconnected (Tr. P. 86). This was further shown by the
disappearance of Albert Hughes. The sheriff was unable
to serve him, and he did not appear at the trial.
But the most important testimony in the case concerning the intent of the Guardtone representatives, was
the testimony concerning the evasion tactics by which the
Guardtone people made definite appointments for salesman
to call on a prospective customer and then repeatedly failed
to show. Mr. Schow stated (Tr. P. 30):
"We even went so far as to pay our own telephone bill
expense from here to Salt Lake, or from Pleasant
Grorve to Salt Lake, and made three definite appoint-
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ments for a salesman to call on this particular pa.rt
because he was interested in one of these, and ~·
wouldn't even keep the appointments that they mad:
Whrn we called and asked thEm to come."
The final telling blow to the Schows and the conclusion of this group of incidents is that they did not receive
the payments promised (Tr. P. 31).
The applicable law for these facts is appropriately
stated in 24 Am. Jur., Sec. 263, P. 96ff.
"Ordiriarily, intent to deceive is not susceptible of direct proof, but can be established only by circumstan.
tial evidence." (Page 97)
"An intention not to perform may be inferred from the
fact that, after performance by the promisee, the prom·
isor does not even make a pretense of carrying out his
promise, or evades and refuses to perform it." (Page

98)

An extended discussion of the law applicable to a fact
situation where the promisor doesn't even make a pretense of performnig the contract or when he evades or refuSes ·responsibility, is found in the case of Foster vs. Dwire
at 51 A.L.R., Page 21, and in particular the annotation
discussion starting on Page 163. This annotation has bren
supplemented at 68 A.L.R. 648, 91 A.L.R. 1306, and 125
A.L.R. 892. The facts of the Foster case indicated that
the plaintiff made a promise to remedy deficiencies in a
certain heating system. He subsequently made no attempt
to do any repair or modification work and the Court said
that this was sufficient evidence to infer that he had no
intent to pmorm his promise at the time that it was made.
The facts. of. the. case beiore this Court are even stronger
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than those in the Dwire cacse, because the Guardtone rep-

resentative made several representations as to appointmencs to make contacts with people on the list submitted
to Guardtone, and even failed to keep those appointments.
Th.is is even stronger evidence of the Guardtone representative's bad faith.

The other subject cases of the annotation go at least
as far as to state that the non-performance without even
a pretense of performance is a sufficient basis for the
requisite intent in fraud.
Appellant draws the Court's attention to the Utah
law in the 1935 case of Nielson vs. Leamington Mines &
Exploration Corp<>ration at 87 Utah 69.
In that case
the Court by way of dicta stated rthat non-performance
alone is not sufficient evidence of the fraud. The Court
stated further on Page 78:
"The evidence in this case fails to show any lack of
good faith in making the contract or any intent on
Garn's part not to perform his agreements, assuming
that the agreement relied on by plaintiff was made.
A conscientious effort was made by Garn with the
assistance of plaintiff and his father to sell stock and
to promote the development of the mining properties."
The testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Schow shows clearly
that the Nielson case is not applicable to the present
facts. In the Nielson case, the promisor made consistent
efforts subsequent to the promise, to perform the agreement as was agreed to. In the case at hand, the Schows
elicited the subsequent promises to attend appointments
Which the Schows bad specifically made for the Guardtone
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representatives and which the Guardtone representatives
had represented that they would perform. The subsequent
evasion of responsibility, the later apparent insolvency of
Guardtone of Utah Inc., while its alteT ego, Guardtone,
Inc., still exists, and the utter lack of performance in this
case is compelling evidence of the bad faith of the Guarct.
tone representatives.
In this ,action, the above facts were submitted to the
jury for their consideration. The trial court had previously denied a motion for a directed verdict. He submitted the case to the jury on special interrogatories. The
instructions specifically explained the meaning of clear and
convincing evidence, and informed the jury that the evidence must meet this criteria in order to find for Plain·
tiffs.

The jury then brought in a verdict for Plaintiff on the
issues of fraud.
This Court has discussed fraud cases extensively in
the past. It has held that a jury may find fraud and meet
the criteria m clear and convincing even when the testi·
mony is in sharp disagreement. See Stuck v. Delta Land
and Water Co., 63 Utah 495, 227 Pac. 791, at 63 Utah
525. Yet, in this case there was no conflicting testimony
on the issues of fraud or intent to defraud. The testimony
if believed contained a harsh indictment of the practices
of the Guardtooe -representatives, and provided a legal
basis for the finding of intentional fraud.
This Court has been loath to overturn the jury's find·
ings on the credibility of witnesses. See Brunson vs.
Strong, recently decided by this Court.
Therefore, to overturn the jury verdict is to eliJJlinate
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their function in a fraud case, where, as here, the testimony was legally sufficient if believed.
Appellant, therefore, submits that the lower court
erred, and that the testimony and jury verdict are legally
sufficient, and that, therefore, the action should be reversed and judgment entered on the verdict without a new
t1ial.

POINT II

THE COURT ERRED IN SEPARATING THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR TRIAL AND IN EXCLUDING EVtJDENCE OF IDENTICAL FRAUDULENT PROMISES
AND

NON-PERFORMANCE.

The very essence of the Plaintiffs' claim is that the
Guardtone people had a geneTal fraudulent and false scheme
and followed a common course of action to defraud each
and all of the Plaintiffs. It is the Plaintiffs' contention
that where the Guardtone representatives made identical
promises and representations to each of the Plaintiffs and
then failed to perform in each case in an identical manner, that this is net only relevant and material evidence of
fraud and the intent to defraud, but that it would be compelling evidence of the intent to defraud.

Plaintiffs' counsel made his offer of proof of these
matters on Pages 98, 99, 100 and 101.

The law on the subject is succinctly stated at 24 Am.
Jur., Sec. 270, Page 109, and pages following. That rule

is stated as:

"One of the fundamental principles of relevancy which
excludes evidence of other acts, even of a similar nature, by the party charged with the commission of a
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particular act, is subject to the limitation that wh
one's motive or intent is an issue, his acts, statemen~
and conduct on other occasions which have a bearin'
upon his motive or intention upon the occasion in que;
tion are competent evidence. The limitation is applied
extensively in fraud cases where intent, knowledge,
and scienter so often constitute Essential elements of
fraud.
. Similar frauds committed by a person
charged in a civil action with the commission of a
fraud are admissible against him upon the issue of motive, intent, or scienter, provided it may be reasonably
inferred that the motive which prompted him to commit the fraud offered in proof was the same as that
which directed him in committing the fraud charged
in the action. Subsequent frauds are well as frauds
committed prior to the fraud charged are within such
rule."
The Utah law on this subject is in emphatic agreement
with the above rule. In Ogden Valley Trout & Resort
Company vs. Lewis, at 41 Utah 183, 125 Pac. 687, the issue
of other representations was clearly discussed. The Court
summarizes that rule on Page 195:
"Statements or representations made to others are.
however, relevant where the intent, motive, or know!·
edge of the falsity of the representations of the party
making them are material, or to prove a system or
general plan or scheme to defraud."
Extensive authority and discussion follows.
This rule was upheld in the Utah case of Smith vs.
Gilbert, 49 Utah 510, 163 P. 1026.
Since this appeal is based upon the trial court's failure
to find a fraudulent intent, the testimony which was of·
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fered was clearly relevant, and the court's exclusion constitutes reversible error.
Should this Court deny Appellants' request to set aside
the Judgment notwithstanding the verdict, then Appellant
requests a new trial on the ground of the eITOI' in exclu,..
sion of the offered testimony.
POINT ill
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF GUARDTONE, INC., AND PRUDENTIAL
FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION WITHOUT PROOF OF THEIR CLAIM OR DERIVATION OF
THEIR PURPORTED ASSIGNMENT.

Mr. and Mrs. Schow testified that they dealt with
Guardtone of Utah (Tr. P. 21, 47). This was shown by
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2. The original of that contract is ~
fendants' Exhibit 11. It has been changed and the name
of Guardtone of Utah, Inc., has. 'been. scratched out and
Guardtone, Inc. and the initials W.V JD. are substituted ·
therefor.
Under the general rules of contract law, Defendants:

had an obligation to Guardtone of Utah, Inc. Under the
gen2ral laws of assignment, when an asmgnee claims .
that he holds a contract right assigned from another~
the law holds, and rightfully so, that tlhe promisor has a
right to protect himself by insisting upon an adequate
showing that he is paying the right person, i e. that the
~ignee is a bona fide assignee and that th.el obligation .
is owed to the assignee rather than the assignor. It is
ridiculous to claim that a promisor could be estopped from
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this privilege of protecting himself by the

mere fact of

payment or other performance to the assignee when he
relies upon the assignee's representations. To hold that
the payment would be a sufficient estoppel would be to say
that the wrong doer, the assignee, by virtue of his false
representations, could legally legitimize his representations
by procuring e. reliance upon them. This has the legal
unfortunate effect of obligating the promisor not only to
the fraudulent assignee, but also to the promissee under
the contract who still has a valid claim against the promisor. The law is not and should not be that the prootisor
is obligated and bound irrevocably to make payments to
anyone who asserts a claim without a proof of authority.
In the action at hand, the Schows contracted with Guardtone of Utah, Inc. Presently, the Defendant, Prudential
Federal Savings & Loan Association, is claiming to be
assignee from Guardtone, Inc. Prudential has stated in
its interrogatories that it had no dealings with Guardtone
of Utah, Inc. (Answers to Interrogatories, Record on Appeal, Page 80).
Since Guardtone of Utah, Inc. is in default this issue
also beoomes material to Plaintiff's right of execution
against Guardtone of Utah, Inc. If Guardtone of Utah, Inc.
does still hold the ownership in this purchase contract, then
the Schows may execute on this contract.
This is further emphasized by the fact that Utah law
holds that if the defunct Guardtone of Utah, Inc. did ac·
tually purport to convey ownership of the contract while
it had the obvious outstanding obligations on the adver·
tising agreements, then the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act makes that conveyance void. See Utah Code Ann°"
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tated 25-1-8. This would negate the claim of Guardtone,
Inc. and Prudential and properly place the responsibility
with Guardtone of Utah, Inc. which is in default on the
issue of fraud and has very obviously violated and breached
the contract which it made.
Nevertheless, both Prudential and Guardtone, Inc.
have refused to show that their claim was bona fide assigned or transferred to them from Guard.tone of Utah,
Inc.
The law on this subject can be found at 6 Am. Jur. 2d
317, Section 136:
"In actions upon assigned claims, the rules and prin-

ciples of evidence applicable to civil actions generally
apply. The party who asserts the affirmative of any
i§ue raised therein has the burden of proving that
issue, usually by a preponderance of the evidence, although a higher degree of proof may be required as
to particular issues such as fraud. He may be assisted by certain presumptions, for example, an assignment in writing or an absolute assignment may be
preswned to be supported by a sufficient considera-

tion.

However, authority of a corporate officer to make an
assignment of indebtedness due to the corporation will
not be presumed; it must be proved. And there is no
presumption of an ~ignment which arises from the
mere pas.session of a chose in action.

Unless the defendants admit the assignment under
which the plaintiff claims, it is incumbent upon ·the
plaintiff to prove a valid assignment in order to show
that he has a cause of action."
In the case of Brown v. ~posito, 157 Pa. Super. 147,
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42 Atlantic 2d 93, the Pennsylvania Court stated the rea.
son for the rule as follows, page 94:
"When suit is brought against the defendant by a stran.
ger to his contract, he is entitled to proof that the
plaintiff is the owner of the claim against him. This
protection must be afforded the defendant. Otherwise,
the defendant might find himself subjected to the same
liability to the original owner of the cause of action, in
the event that there was no actual ~gnment."
The case of Mountain Stat.es Wat.er Company v. Town
of KingwOOd, West Vuginia., 1 S.E. 2d 395, page 398, the
Court states the rule as follows:
"Usually, an assignee must, by appropriate allegations,
trace his title to the thing signed. 4 Am. Jur. 330,
Section 26; 5 C. J. 1008 Section 224. While it is optional whether he institute the proceeding in his own
name, or in that of his assignor (Skraggs v. Hill, 37
West Virginia, 706, 712, 17 S.E. 185) if brought in
his own name, then the declaration or notice must
set forth the assignment so as to trace title in the
plaintiff.''

It is clear in the present case that Prudential 1Federal
Savings and Loan Association acquired no title by reason
of its purported assignment, since the corporation it dealt '
with was Guardtone, Inc., who in fact, had no contract or
interest in a contract to assign. It is further clear that
the contract had been altered without the knowledge or

consent of the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs therefore respectfUUY
submit that where these two Defendants have not shown a
valid claim by a preponderance of the evidence or by any
evidence at all, that they have no claim in law for a judg·
ment in their favor against the Defendants.
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CONCLUSION
The jury verdict should be reinstated and judgment
In the alternative, the case should be
2 ntered thereon.
remanded to the lower court for a new trial, with directions to the lower court concerning proper admissibility of
evidence.

Respectfully submitted,

S. REX LEWIS
HOWARD AND LEWIS
Delphi Building
120 East Third North

Provo, Utah

Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant

